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INTRODUCTION
The advertised title of this talk could not have sounded very promising to
political scientists here in Barcelona. With six years of political discourse leading
up to Barcelona ’92, and over three years of investigation, analysis, and polemic
after these Games, there can be little left to say here on the local and regional
dimensions of the theme of «politics and the Olympics».
Any Barcelona audience already knows a lot about: the politics of selecting
host cities for the Games; the Olympic incitement of struggles, negotiations, and
eventual collaborations among municipal, autonomous provincial, federal state,
and regional political entities; the unique Olympic mobilization of political capital
for urban redevelopment and infrastructure transformation; and the impetus the
Olympic context provides for cultural politics, as against what we might call the
politics of the everyday1. Moreover, the publication by my colleagues at the
Centre d’Estudis Olímpics at the Universitat Autònoma of their detailed empirical
studies of the television communication of Catalan, Spanish, and European
political realities in distant nations takes care of a key «global» dimension of
«local» Olympic experience2.
The best one could offer, then, would seem to be some comparative
analyses with other Games.  For example, we could discuss the contradictory
position into which the question of «Europe» placed the Social Democratic
political tradition in Norway. We could contrast the Catalan Generalitat’s and the
Barcelonan Ajuntament’s use of «Europe» as an instrument against the Spanish
center with the Norwegian socialist center’s attempt to use the 1994 Lillehammer
Games to convince Norwegian voters that they could have their European cake
and eat it too.  Faced with conservative political forces focused on a new
cosmopolitan business class, the Norwegian Social Democrats sought, with very
mixed results, to use Lillehammer as evidence that Norway could maintain a
decades-old policy and ideology of rural community autonomy and cultural value,
while simultaneously subjecting itself to EU membership and regulation3. Or we
could compare Barcelona and Lillehammer with the very different political
thematics of Atlanta, where the main intention is to dramatize and globalize a
message of minority human rights and multicultural cooperation in the post-Cold
War liberal state, in the context of failure to generate much in the way of local
urban renewal.
Instead, however, I will focus my remarks on the central organs of the
Olympic Movement, notably the International Olympic Committee (IOC)
executive, in their interactions with macro-political forces and trends in recent
years. I hasten to reassure you that I won’t return to the boring old curriculum of
topics: fascist, socialist, and capitalist Olympics; government «interference» in
sport; Cold War battles between «East» and «West»; terrorism; boycotts, and so
on. I will discuss an important new book about the IOC and Seoul ’88, which
opens to public scrutiny a new dimension of Olympic geopolitical engagements.
Yet I will also suggest that this text inadvertently signals an end to this WWII-
through-Cold War Olympic political curriculum.  After briefly characterizing the
new shape of world affairs, I will conclude by describing current efforts by the IOC
to rematerialize an «Olympic Movement» and to make itself more relevant in the
new geopolitical environment. This to-ing and fro-ing, I will suggest, makes the
Olympics a still more illuminating window into the fundamental, yet still very
inchoate political dynamics in the global environment of today.
FIELD WORK UNDER OLYMPIC COVER
Political scientists, at least in the European and American institutions and
traditions I am most familiar with, have rarely suspected that there might be
dimensions of engagement between major geopolitical actors and the Olympics
besides the conventional ones I have just listed.  Professional pride in dealing
with the «real» forms of modern power4, together with the cultural common sense
of social milieus which place sport categorically into the realm of the ludic, or
leisure, or idealistic, or strictly commercial domains of life have conspired to blunt
the political-scientific imagination5.
Scholars of international diplomacy and national security might well
conduct the following thought experiment. If you are a head-of-state, senior
foreign affairs official, diplomat or security actor, what would describe the ideal
context for you to pursue your most delicate and controversial aims and
responsibilities? The answer is an environment offering maximal possibilities of
same-level interaction with enemies, rivals, and allies, with a minimum of prior
constraints, public awareness, and press scrutiny. Without realizing it, you have
just described conditions at an Olympic Games.
The significance of the Olympic Games and related international sports
events as scenes for high-level political and diplomatic encounters is composed
of two elements. Here is the first. Mass publics and the press today consider it
«only natural» that high-level political elites attend Olympic Games. Because
athletic delegations are composed on a national basis, politicians and
government officials attend «to show support for the nation». Even when they
have not put it about that they are sports fans, such persons are widely assumed
to wish to be where all the other dignitaries and celebrities are. As for military and
state security figures, if their presence at an Olympics is even noticed, it is
attributed to supervising the protection of athletes and other national delegation
members, given the ever-present dangers of terrorism6. Finally, a kind of artificial
taboo against the normal types of press and public curiosity reigns during an
Olympic Games. I’ve many times heard state officials successfully deflect political
questions about their activities in the Olympic city with a casual, «We’re just here
to visit the Games, let’s save local political business for another time».
The second component you would have no way of knowing if you had not
yourself been a credentialed guest at the Olympic Games, that is to say if you
had done ethnographic field work under «Olympic cover»7. The deepest circle of
«Olympic Family Zones» at the stadiums, administrative installations, and
headquarters hotels is absolutely closed to all but «A» credentialed persons (IOC
members and their families) and «G» credentialed persons, precisely heads-of-
state and their staffs, top-level diplomats and government officials, IGO chiefs,
military and security figures, international tycoons, some decorative international
celebrities, and a number of persons whose identities are never clear to anyone.
No journalists can ever get near these secured areas, and few even know of their
existence. Even the approaches to these innocent-sounding «hospitality zones»
are hidden and carefully and rigidly monitored.
In sum, nowhere else do such favorable conditions exist for otherwise
difficult meetings -on an invisible, informal, and agenda-less basis- among such a
total range of global political elites, including from nations at war or having no
diplomatic relations with one another. I am sure that when diplomatic and national
security historians and analysts put aside their cultural and scientific biases and
explore this context, they will make some very interesting discoveries.
We already know quite a bit about state-level political activity by other sorts
of actors operating under «Olympic cover», for example, intelligence and counter-
intelligence personnel. It has been a more or less open secret in Olympic circles
that the so-called Olympic attachés, nationals resident in the host country
appointed to assist their home country delegations, have generally been secret
service agents. Ostensibly there to help visiting delegations navigate the local
society, their real mission has traditionally been to monitor and control all foreign
contacts of athletes, coaches, and officials, preventing defections or other
embarrassing incidents, and of course to attempt to «turn» each other.
Revelations in the former communist countries have made public what also
was common knowledge to insiders: that secret police agencies regularly
recruited athletes and other sports personnel as informants, disinformation and
penetration agents. Olympic Solidarity, the IOC agency responsible for sports aid
to Third World countries, for years accepted volunteer services from superpower
sports personnel whose real identities and intentions had much more to do with
state political agendas that with sports development. The most famous published
exposé by a former American CIA agent included a whole chapter asserting an
sustained Olympic CIA presence since Helsinki and detailing his own counter-
intelligence operations under Olympic cover in Mexico. I have developed further
information that the CIA and DIA used international sport throughout the 1960s
and 1970s as a very successful cover for covert counter-insurgency training in
Latin America and the Middle East8. Just as scores of American reviews of the
infamous Agee book ignored its Olympic sections, so too former counter-
insurgency sports operatives still chuckle today as to the domestic perfection in
the USA of this cover. «For Americans, it’s mere sport, so who would imagine,
much less inquire?» Soviet authorities, of course, knew full well, and because of
the Soviet state’s own clearer intelligence preoccupation with sport, Soviet and
Central European athletic circles and wider publics often assumed that Americans
on Olympic missions were «CIA» agents.  By contrast, American sports persons
and wider publics assumed the «communists» were state security, but scarcely
imagined that the holy «We» might be so too9.
Another variation on our theme is the double political and sports identities
IOC members sometimes have. The best known of these here in Barcelona is
probably Juan Antonio Samaranch’s position as Spanish ambassador to the
USSR at the same time as he was negotiating unsuccessfully for the IOC to
prevent the Olympic boycotts. A more successful case might be Muhammed
Mzali, who at the time he was prime minister of Tunisia also was head of the IOC
commission for the International Olympic Academy in Greece and a yearly
lecturer there on the theme of Islam and Olympism. One year, because of the
cover of his annual Olympic visit to Greece, Mzali was able to stop in Athens for
the negotiations which led to the successful evacuation through Greece to Tunisia
of the PLO fighters surrounded by the Israelis in Beirut. Today, at least one IOC
member who began his career as a penetration agent for a national security force
continues to be financed and influential for shadier masters in today’s post-Cold
War era.
FIVE RINGS AROUND KOREA
The 1994 publication of the book Five Rings Over Korea: The Secret
Negotiations Behind the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul10 has, I believe,
permanently changed conditions for political analysts of the Olympic Movement.
The author, Richard Pound, is the senior IOC member in Canada, a long-time
presence in the IOC’s executive board, and a member of Mr. Samaranch’s inner
circle. The author has made the most of his privileged access to internal IOC
documents, minutes, correspondence, contemporaneous conversations, and
post-hoc interviews to describe and analyze key diplomatic interventions which
helped overcome the geopolitical struggles unleashed by the 1981 award of the
Olympic Games to Seoul, contributing to the eventually triumphant Olympic
celebration in the South Korean capital in 1988. Mr. Pound has also presented an
argument about the new geopolitical capacities of the IOC itself, and his detailed
insider account will stand hereafter as a required touchstone for any serious
academic, media, or policy analyst of «international sport and politics»11.
In an opening chapter, Mr. Pound summarily reviews IOC responses to the
«external» political challenges of past Olympic Games, from Berlin 1936 to the
boycotted Olympics of 1976, 1980, and 1984. While rightly contemptuous of a
standard media caricature of the IOC as a «moribund, antediluvian collection of
aging, rich, and titled men completely unconnected with reality»12, Mr. Pound
serves up some telling anecdotes to show that the «separation of sport and
politics» rhetoric of past IOC leaders was generally a fig-leaf for their own political
inadequacies. Throughout this period, Mr. Pound writes, «‘political’ problems were
beyond the ability of a part-time organization having no particular international
status; the IOC was not equipped, either organizationally or by disposition, to deal
with such issues. Any action by the IOC tended to be in response to a crisis or to
someone else’s initiative»13. According to the author, the IOC’s reliance on state-
level politicians to solve conflicts bearing upon the Games led inevitably to
frustration and tragedy.
By contrast, and in the aftermath of the Los Angeles boycott, the IOC at
last formally recognized that NOCs are not always politically free to discharge
their Olympic duty of participation and accepted the corollary that the IOC, NOCs,
and other Olympic bodies have positive duties to actively engage government
entities and state politicians in Olympic affairs. The geopolitical dangers and
dilemmas resulting from the award of the Games to Seoul demanded a new
activism. Led by Mr. Samaranch, who is the uncompromised and
uncompromising hero sub specie diplomaticus of Mr. Pound’s book, the IOC
embarked on an unprecedented political voyage of high risk/high gain, not only
with respect to the Seoul Olympics but to the world prestige and legitimacy of the
entire Olympic Movement. The catalyst and avenue was the appearance of
proposals and eventually negotiations between North Korea and South Korea
over some form of «co-hosting» the 1988 Olympics. The IOC made the decision,
extraordinary given its history and the stakes of this game, to itself sponsor and
attempt to control these negotiations.
Over six chapters and 200 pages, Mr. Pound reconstructs in minute detail
the complex and multilateral antagonisms, posturings, misunderstandings,
interventions, negotiations, and executive actions which produced the four North-
South meetings held in Lausanne under IOC sponsorship and supervision, the
continuation of initiatives and counter-initiatives right up until the opening of the
Games, and the extraordinary end-result of a Seoul Games with only seven
boycotting countries. Perhaps the author’s professional experience as a lawyer is
responsible for his appreciation that the diplomat’s art lies in the minute scrutiny
and careful staging of continuously shifting adversarial situations.  In any case,
scholars should be grateful that Mr. Pound has resisted any temptation to scrimp
on his narrative. No existing text provides more fundamental education both for
Olympic analysts unfamiliar with the conduct of international diplomacy and for
international relations specialists ignorant of the significance and role of the
Olympic Games in their domain. Indeed, appearing amidst the continued
multilateral negotiations over North Korean nuclear policy, Five Rings has a
topicality beyond its immediate subject matter.
Mr. Samaranch’s wisdom, as Mr. Pound interprets it, lay in clear
recognition of synergies on the strategic level which in turn permitted flexibility on
the tactical level. As long as North and South Koreas were kept together at the
table, the North’s state socialist and anti-American allies were limited in their
capacity to undermine the Seoul Games. Since a breakthrough which would bring
DPRK participation might always occur, and the IOC was so boldly signaling a
willingness to accommodate North Korea, space was opened for states like the
PRC to develop an independent policy. At the same time, forces favorable to
participation within the USSR and the East European countries were better able
to hold off hard-liners within their own state-party-Olympic apparatuses. DPRK
initiatives against Seoul were likewise moderated. The IOC’s «historic offer» of
considering the staging of some events in the North, that is, of violating a core
tenet of its own Charter that Games are awarded to single cities only, made it
difficult for critics politically schooled to see the organization as an transnational
instrument of Western capitalist imperialism and anti-communism. The
consternation, real or imagined, that IOC flexibility toward North Korea was
believed to be causing the ROK and the Pacific alliance further loosened the
binariness of classical Cold War logic. This strategic policy left the IOC and the
Seoul Olympics in maximal position to take advantage of the purely contingent
outbreak of Gorbachevism which happened to ensue.
What I have elsewhere called the «participation mystique» of the Olympic
Movement, a commitment to maximal international participation in the Games as
its ultimate and absolute value, kept the IOC leadership oriented in line with this
strategic geopolitical synergy. Tactically, it followed that Mr. Samaranch and his
colleagues and advisers had a clear path of action. The concrete issues in the
ebb and flow of negotiations centered on how many and which events were
considered for the North, the name of the Games and the organizing committees,
the location of the opening and closing ceremonies and the torch relay, the
division of television and sponsorship income, and the opening of the North-South
border at least to the Olympic Family. The art Mr. Samaranch displayed month
after month was knowing when to appear to bend in the face of shifting and
escalating demands by North Korea and her friends, and when to appear to
harden the IOC’s positions when the ROK, her allies, and the international sports
federations and multinational corporations contracted to the Games grew overly
nervous. The main challenge was thus deftly met of keeping IOC control of the
agenda and not letting the negotiations be highjacked by either principal or any
third party.
Perhaps the chief compass which allowed Mr. Samaranch and his advisers
to move so adroitly over such complex terrain was the IOC leadership’s belief
from the outset that the negotiations would never lead to an agreement. Mr.
Pound is perfectly direct on this point. «The IOC had to appear to be conducting
the negotiations in good faith and it did, in fact, conduct them in good faith. The
fact that the IOC did not believe that the negotiations could ever result in a
mutually satisfactory compromise to share the Games in an equitable fashion
between the North and the South was irrelevant in the conduct of the
negotiations. Had they been successful, there is no doubt that the IOC would
have agreed to the split venue. The IOC also did its best to create conditions that
might bring about an agreement, despite its realistic political assessment that it
simply would not be possible to get the North Koreans to comply with the myriad
responsibilities of a host country of the Olympic Games»14.
There is much to appreciate as well as to question in Mr. Pound’s
account15, but I will only comment here on a more encompassing ring of the
geopolitical onion of Seoul ’88 that students of international politics will find
suggestively evoked but strangely unanalyzed in this book.  Neither Mr. Pound
nor, by his account, Mr. Samaranch seemed able to imagine that the IOC
negotiations might themselves have been used as a diplomatic convenience and
public «cover» for the truly secret negotiations among the real North and South
Korean, superpower, regional, and free-lance geopolitical actors, concerned not
just with Olympics but with deals for the eventual North-South unification, the
future balance of power in the region, and what in retrospect we recognize as the
end of the Cold War in East Asia.
The book itself attributes the original suggestion of sharing events between
Seoul and Pyongyang to then Italian foreign minister Guilio Andreotti in
independent conversation with the ROK government. The South and North
Korean governments quickly mobilized, not just with respect to the IOC but with
their allies around the world. Even before the IOC membership was officially
notified of these proposals, actors ranging from Fidel Castro to the senior Soviet,
Chinese, and American leaderships were significantly engaged. Mr. Pound only
mentions that «rumors» of secret North-South negotiations were reaching the IOC
well before the decision to sponsor talks in Lausanne was taken. Figures like
premiers Nakasone of Japan and Zhou Ziyang of China, George Schultz, Frank
Carlucci, and James Lilley of the United States, and Mikhail Gorbachev, Edouard
Shevardnadze, and Viacheslav Gavrilin of the Soviet Union make only cameo
appearances in Five Rings. Finally, in Pound’s descriptions of the IOC talks, the
members of the Korean delegations are listed, with official sports titles, but there
is little evidence of any IOC effort to discover who these persons really were in
the North and South Korean political environments16. Though privately informed
of other widespread «rumors» at the time, for example, of the secret presence of
scores of Soviet government advisers and even of important North Korean
political figures in South Korea between 1986 and the opening of the Games,
neither the IOC executive nor Mr. Pound in later preparing his book bothered to
inquire carefully. Mr. Pound makes the point of how extraordinary it was for South
Korean political authorities to trust the IOC with negotiating what was (and
remains) the most important question of Korean national existence. Unfortunately,
the author and presumably the IOC did not pause very long to wonder whether
that trust really was so absolute. In par, this was surely because Roh Tae-woo’s
adroit leadership had succeeded in winning IOC confidence, and Mr. Samaranch
and the rest of the IOC «politburo» -Alexandru Siperco of Romania, Aswini Kumar
of Pakistan, the Senegalese Kéba M’Baye, and the Chinese He Zhenliang-
satisfied themselves with the IOC’s new significance and interaction at the heads-
of-state level.
What I am suggesting is certainly not that this new IOC political importance
and influence be trivialized or underestimated. I believe that Mr. Pound is
absolutely correct in his analysis of this dimension of the geopolitical importance
of the IOC. The world of academic political science and international politics does
indeed have some catching up to do in its appreciation of this new situation of
mutuality between the international state system and important NGOs (or
QUANGOs -quasi-non-governmental organizations) like the IOC. What I am
arguing is that there appears to have developed another, complementary
dimension that should not be ignored by either the IOC or political scientists.
Precisely because of its increased political capacities, the IOC may now be of
new interest to state security and foreign policy actors as a witting or unwitting
instrument in the pursuit of their policies.
But, of course, in the aftermath of Seoul, both world politics and the
particular geopolitical engagements of the IOC rapidly changed. The collapse of
the Soviet Union, the end of communist governments in Eastern Europe, and the
shift of attention to de-centered regional and infra-national conflicts outside of the
old bi-polar ordering of the Cold War system have contributed to rearranging the
very concepts, much less the practices of «geopolitics» today. The awarding of
subsequent Olympics to Barcelona, Lillehammer, Atlanta, Sydney, and Nagano -
relatively uncontroversial and insignificant places from the standpoint of
international geopolitics, at least by comparison with Seoul- can be seen to have
left the IOC with little opportunity to exercise and deploy its new political
capacities at this level. After the defeat of the PRC-Beijing initiative for 2000, and
with a potential vote for Cape Town 2004 still years away17, the IOC’s political
engagements have so to say fallen back to the level of what I earlier called the
«old curriculum of sport and politics». At the same time, the IOC, like many other
governmental and non-governmental actors in a newly decentered «world
system», has suddenly found itself confronted by and struggling for legitimacy
among a new set of forces, notable those styled «new social movements» in the
jargon of political sociology.
THE «WORLD SYSTEM» TODAY
Few today seem to disagree that we are in the midst of rapid structural
change in the world system. Among the factors cited by political scientists are
new forms of «decentered» or «disorganized» capitalism and the weakening of
the nation-state model from several directions at once. Post-WWII military
alliances like NATO are in the throes of reconception and realignment in the
aftermath of the Cold War and in the face of crises like Bosnia and the Gulf.
Simultaneously loosed from Cold War discipline and faced with shrinking or
unpredictable big state markets, weapons dealers, security merchants,
technology brokers, and military consultants roam the world in a newly
competitive and entrepreneurial search for customers of any sort.
New supranational political entities and trade compacts, like the EU and
NAFTA, are eroding the conventional powers and prerogatives of foreign
ministries and national executive branches. Claims of increased autonomy among
historical regions and minority populations, as here in Catalunya, elsewhere in
Europe, and in Canada and Sri Lanka, are challenging the federal state from
within.  In certain cases, like Greece, EU requirements are forcing a radical
devolving of administrative and electoral power from the central government to
the provinces and districts.  In my own country, conservative politicians and
populist movements now sound just like old Marxists, in their calls for a «withering
away» of the central state. Everywhere, state-centered nation-building either
seems to have finished its work -as in South Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan- or else
to have abandoned the project completely before the goal was even neared, as in
Nigeria, Rwanda, and other African countries. As a consequence, those few
cases where the classic process of nation-building seems still to be the order of
the day -South Africa or Burma, for example- attract a world attention that
scarcely recognizes itself to be as much nostalgic as progressive.
Meanwhile, in the G-7 countries, both civil society and the state are
embroiled in the «problem» of national boundaries which seem more permeable
than before. The rhetorics gushing forth -whether of «xenophobia» and cultural
incommensurability in Europe18, or of work without social service costs in the
U.S.- seem in some cases to have thrown us back to the early 20th, if not to the
19th centuries. These new debates on «immigration» suppress much discourse
about the 50 million or more permanent refugees in the world. No one seems able
to recognize, much less to conceptualize and analyze the phenomenon of
growing millions of persons -both elites and wage-working transhumants- who
hold dual citizenships and for whom nationality has become little more than a
bureaucratic inconvenience or a «life-style» choice. This development is perhaps
the most auspicious sign of all. If the de-ontologization of nationality is indeed a
wave of the future, then we shall know for certain that «post-modern identity» is
something new and not just high-modernism in more fashionable intellectual
clothing19.
NSMS AND NGOS IN THE PRESENT GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
A large literature, emanating mostly from Europe but also influential in
North America, has lately explored the growing importance of «new social
movements» (NSMs) in this altered geopolitical regime: feminism,
environmentalism, immigrant and gay rights movements, for example. Given the
continued importance of political parties in Europe, as social institutions, agenda-
setting devices, and signs of legitimacy in political space, some of these NSMs
have give birth to political parties, like the Greens, with consequent tensions and
polemics with «originalist» movement leaders who wish to stay outside of the
formal political system.  In my country, where political parties are comparatively
unimportant, NSMs have chiefly made their presence felt through the courts, legal
institutions being the most important structural engines of our system.
The transnational aspect these NSMs are increasingly taking on is an
especially interesting phenomenon. As evidenced by such international mega-
events as the Rio Conference on the environment and the Beijing Women’s
Congress, formerly small-scale and community-based movements like ecology
and feminism have developed into transnational actors still rooting themselves in
civil society, but now capable of mobilizing, even often coercing, national
governments, intergovernmental institutions like the UN and the EU, and global
media. The tri-partite structure of these events is very interesting and revealing. It
is «the movement» which gives them their motive and moral force, while the
meetings themselves are divided into the «official» intergovernmental and the
«unofficial» or «quasi-official» parallel meeting of NGOs. Though there is
considerable traffic of persons, issues, and resources between them, each side
acts to preserve the boundary. The states do not wish to seem to be abandoning
their authority to the NGOs, while the NGOs risk delegitimation among their
constituents by to close an association with the normal global system of nation-
state interactions. In effect, the NSMs are no serving as a kind of matchmaker
bringing together (but separately) NGOs and IGOs concerned with their issues.
This same paradigmatic structuring was apparent in the recent Euro-
Mediterranean meetings here in Barcelona, but with a transformation. Since
«Euromed-ism» is hardly itself a true movement, it was the NGOs Conferència
Mediterrània Alternativa which brought out the ecologists, anti-racists, feminists,
and gay rights activists for meetings and demonstrations.
NGOs, of course, have a much longer history than NSMs, at least if one
grants the apologists and academic analysts of these movements their definitions
of «new». But, as any reader of Max Weber would expect, probably all major
NGOs historically derive from some «movement» of greater or lesser self-
consciousness and social significance. This includes the IOC itself, as the
historical titration of something called «The Olympic Movement». The founder of
the modern Olympics, Pierre de Coubertin, never wavered in his insistence that
international sports contests were only to be powerful means to the real ends of
this Olympic Movement: peace, intercultural education, and international
understanding20. Recent historical scholarship has demonstrated how much
more thoroughly than heretofore known, Coubertin and the early IOC were
embedded in the international peace and education movements of the late 19th
and early 20th centuries21.
IOC members today are mostly ignorant of this history, but at least some
worry that they have ceased to shepherd a movement and have become an
institution and even an industry. At the Olympic Centennial Congress in Paris, for
example, one senior IOC member, a household name and a key independentista
in his Latin American country, noticed the crowd on one side of a fashionable
Paris hotel lobby and the few gathered on the other side. «Today», he lamented,
«there are more and more who believe in Olympic sport; there are fewer and
fewer who believe in the Olympic Movement».
In the last three years, there has been a perfect flurry of efforts from the
Lausanne headquarters to associate the Olympics with and to get the IOC
represented in NSM contexts. The IOC sent an official representative to the Rio
World Environment Summit. His program was to insist that the new sensitivity to
environmental preservation in construction of Winter Games installations, the
ecology thematics of Lillehammer and Nagano Games, and the environmental
activism of former Olympic champions demonstrated how Olympism and
ecologism were intrinsically related. Jacques Cousteau was made a chief
ornament of the Paris Centennial Congress, and politicians with strong
environmental agendas, like US Vice-President Albert Gore, have been invited to
address other Olympic meetings with this theme in mind.
The IOC has also been trying to revive connections with the «peace
movement». Prodded perhaps by Norwegian athletes’ and governmental efforts
toward «Olympic Aid» to war-ravaged Sarajevo, the IOC quickly jumped to
display its own concern, most dramatically through Mr. Samaranch’s plane trip
there from Lillehammer. In perhaps its greatest success to date and one which
illustrates a new mood of cooperation with the established IGOs, the IOC this
year convinced the UN General Assembly to pass a resolution backing the idea of
the «Olympic Truce», or cessation of all hostilities around the world during a
Games. Though any actual historical connection to ancient Greek practice is
dubious at best, this idea has allowed the IOC at least to invoke something of its
old connections to philhellenism. So obsessive have such efforts become that the
IOC is turning up in very odd places, including a last minute effort to horn in on
the Euro-Med conferences here in Barcelona. In alliance with another NGO, the
International Olaf Palme Foundation, the IOC scheduled a day-long conference to
discuss «the potential of the Olympic spirit as an instrument of peace in the
[Mediterranean] zone». (In the event, only eleven people attended, and the
program was shortened).
International feminism has presented much greater difficulties for the IOC.
These tensions illustrate the broader collision between transnational NSMs and
NGOs/ QUANGOs like the IOC, which remain based on the nation-state model of
recruitment and representation. Of course, the IOC has for many years been
increasing sports events for women in the Games and the number of its own
female members. It has held conferences and mounted museum exhibitions on
the theme of women in sports. Recently, it has even been willing to demand
fulfillment of quotas for women officers in its partner NOCs and IFs (International
Sports Federations), where the record of gender equity has been particularly
abominable. Threats of removal from the Olympic Movement and program for
non-compliance have been issued by the IOC, a high-risk strategy, but one the
leadership felt it must embark on in order to display its commitment to feminists
inside and outside sport.
But French and American groups and NGOs within the Northern
Hemisphere feminist movement have lately increased the stakes, publicly
demanding that the IOC deny Olympic participation to all countries which do not
send female athletes to the Games. Aimed primarily at conservative Islamic
nations and certain countries in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, these
demands place the IOC uncomfortably between «universal human rights», on the
one hand, and «respect for multicultural integrity» on the other. The IOC is now
struggling with how to respond in the debate over feminism and feminist
imperialism, a world-wide debate, as the UN Beijing Congress on women made
perfectly clear.
There are several ways to interpret these developments. Cynics will see
them as the IOC’s attempt to deflect world-wide criticism that it has become more
a creature and agency of the global sports industry of television and commercial
sponsors than anything resembling a social movement, or even as treatments for
the personal reputation of the IOC president in sectors of the European press.
Partisans will, by contrast, see them as sincere attempts to return to and to better
serve Olympism’s original and core commitments as a movement for peace and
international education. I have suggested the additional factor of frustration for
Mr. Samaranch and his politburo that the IOC’s new geopolitical competence and
accomplishments represented by Seoul have not received due credit, whether in
the form of Nobel Prizes or UN honors, in academic circles and the press, or as
general prestige augmentations for the organization.  Normal response to rapid
changes in the world system, notably the new significance of regional
organizations and new social movements at the expense of the global system of
nation-states model offers a third interpretation. Doubtless, there is some truth in
each of these points of view which, taken together, illustrate very well the larger
political and social processes in the world of the late 20th century.
What this analysis clearly does help us immediately grasp is the
significance of Cape Town to the IOC and the Olympic Movement. If the vote for
2004 were to be taken tomorrow, there seems little doubt about its outcome.
Whatever the political, infrastructural, economic, and technological problems
these Games will offer, only Cape Town offers the IOC a chance to place
simultaneously on the world stage its geopolitical, human rights, and international
peace and development capacities, credits, and commitments.
